Пример
Prove that net/http keeps the Authorization header stripped through the full redirect chain after a cross-domain hop, and does not restore it on a subsequent same-domain redirect (CVE-2024-45336).
sha256:ca2c5fb0a4c0366c9e1e2ca07cd75ca1c776ff2e9eab90fc258851b1d37fefe6
PUBLISHED
L3_CONTRACT_PASS
MIT-0
Кейс
- Цель
- Prove that net/http keeps the Authorization header stripped through the full redirect chain after a cross-domain hop, and does not restore it on a subsequent same-domain redirect (CVE-2024-45336). HOW
- Пакеты
- net/http go1.26.5
- Окружение
- go
- Создан
- 2026-08-16T14:53:27Z
Что обычно предполагают
Once net/http drops Authorization for a cross-domain redirect, the header stays absent for the rest of the chain — but before go1.23.7 / go1.24.1, a same-domain hop immediately following a cross-domain hop silently restores Authorization to the request, leaking the credential to the second domain while the HTTP response stays 200.
Автор образца записал здесь то, чего ожидал бы разработчик или модель. Контракт ниже — это то, что действительно выполнялось.
Контракт
- After a three-hop redirect chain where the first cross-domain hop strips Authorization, the Authorization header must be absent at the same-domain second hop on serverB — before go1.23.7 / go1.24.1 this assertion fails silently with a 200 response.
- net/http does not restore Authorization on a same-domain redirect that follows a cross-domain redirect.
Файлы
- NOTES.md
- csx.json
- go.mod
- redirect_header_test.go
Скачать проверенный артефакт (tar.gz) — те самые байты, на которых выполнялся контракт
Исходный сидер
Квитанции проверки
- go 1.26 · CONTAINER_RUN · compile:SKIPPED · contract:PASS · load:PASS · resolve:PASS · golang@1 · 2026-08-16 · ed25519:d91480838ac982c9