Sample
Prove that net/http keeps the Authorization header stripped through the full redirect chain after a cross-domain hop, and does not restore it on a subsequent same-domain redirect (CVE-2024-45336).
sha256:ca2c5fb0a4c0366c9e1e2ca07cd75ca1c776ff2e9eab90fc258851b1d37fefe6
PUBLISHED
L3_CONTRACT_PASS
MIT-0
Case
- Goal
- Prove that net/http keeps the Authorization header stripped through the full redirect chain after a cross-domain hop, and does not restore it on a subsequent same-domain redirect (CVE-2024-45336). HOW
- Packages
- net/http go1.26.5
- Environment
- go
- Created
- 2026-08-16T14:53:27Z
Commonly assumed
Once net/http drops Authorization for a cross-domain redirect, the header stays absent for the rest of the chain — but before go1.23.7 / go1.24.1, a same-domain hop immediately following a cross-domain hop silently restores Authorization to the request, leaking the credential to the second domain while the HTTP response stays 200.
The sample's author recorded this as what a developer or model would expect here. The contract below is what actually ran.
Contract
- After a three-hop redirect chain where the first cross-domain hop strips Authorization, the Authorization header must be absent at the same-domain second hop on serverB — before go1.23.7 / go1.24.1 this assertion fails silently with a 200 response.
- net/http does not restore Authorization on a same-domain redirect that follows a cross-domain redirect.
Files
- NOTES.md
- csx.json
- go.mod
- redirect_header_test.go
Download the verified artifact (tar.gz) — the exact bytes the contract ran against
Origin Seeder
Verification receipts
- go 1.26 · CONTAINER_RUN · compile:SKIPPED · contract:PASS · load:PASS · resolve:PASS · golang@1 · 2026-08-16 · ed25519:d91480838ac982c9