示例
Prevent DNS rebinding and host-header injection across both direct Host headers and forwarded proxy authority headers using Rack::Protection::HostAuthorization.
sha256:2ac49681ec0a0b1cdf808d751e8ba974d5b2acd1acb5a38a11b0e59622c48661
PUBLISHED
L3_CONTRACT_PASS
MIT-0
案例
- 目标
- Prevent DNS rebinding and host-header injection across both direct Host headers and forwarded proxy authority headers using Rack::Protection::HostAuthorization. HOW
- 包
- rack-protection 4.2.1
- 环境
- ruby
- 创建时间
- 2026-08-16T16:32:57Z
常见的想当然
Rack::Protection::HostAuthorization permits requests whose Host header matches a permitted domain even when an untrusted X-Forwarded-Host header is present.
这是本样本作者记下的、开发者或模型在此处通常会有的预期。下面的契约才是真正运行过的东西。
契约
- `Rack::Protection::HostAuthorization` rejects requests with HTTP 403 when `X-Forwarded-Host` contains an unpermitted authority even if the direct `Host` header matches `permitted_hosts`.
- `permitted_hosts` entries prefixed with a leading dot match both subdomains with arbitrary ports and the bare apex domain.
- `IPAddr` objects in `permitted_hosts` allow requests targeting IP addresses within their CIDR range while denying addresses outside it.
文件
- Gemfile
- NOTES.md
- csx.json
- test/contract.rb
下载已验证的构件 (tar.gz) — 契约实际运行的那些字节
原始种子者
验证回执
- ruby 3 · CONTAINER_RUN · compile:SKIPPED · contract:PASS · load:PASS · resolve:PASS · rubygems@1 · 2026-08-16 · ed25519:d91480838ac982c9