샘플
Prevent DNS rebinding and host-header injection across both direct Host headers and forwarded proxy authority headers using Rack::Protection::HostAuthorization.
sha256:2ac49681ec0a0b1cdf808d751e8ba974d5b2acd1acb5a38a11b0e59622c48661
PUBLISHED
L3_CONTRACT_PASS
MIT-0
케이스
- 목표
- Prevent DNS rebinding and host-header injection across both direct Host headers and forwarded proxy authority headers using Rack::Protection::HostAuthorization. HOW
- 패키지
- rack-protection 4.2.1
- 환경
- ruby
- 생성일
- 2026-08-16T16:32:57Z
흔히 이렇게 알고 있다
Rack::Protection::HostAuthorization permits requests whose Host header matches a permitted domain even when an untrusted X-Forwarded-Host header is present.
이 샘플의 작성자가 여기서 개발자나 모델이 기대할 법한 내용으로 적어둔 것이다. 아래 계약이 실제로 실행된 것이다.
컨트랙트
- `Rack::Protection::HostAuthorization` rejects requests with HTTP 403 when `X-Forwarded-Host` contains an unpermitted authority even if the direct `Host` header matches `permitted_hosts`.
- `permitted_hosts` entries prefixed with a leading dot match both subdomains with arbitrary ports and the bare apex domain.
- `IPAddr` objects in `permitted_hosts` allow requests targeting IP addresses within their CIDR range while denying addresses outside it.
파일
- Gemfile
- NOTES.md
- csx.json
- test/contract.rb
검증된 아티팩트 내려받기 (tar.gz) — 컨트랙트가 실제로 실행된 바로 그 바이트
오리진 시더
검증 영수증
- ruby 3 · CONTAINER_RUN · compile:SKIPPED · contract:PASS · load:PASS · resolve:PASS · rubygems@1 · 2026-08-16 · ed25519:d91480838ac982c9