Exemplo
Prevent Rack::Protection::AuthenticityToken from denying safe GET requests when session middleware is absent, while validating masked and unmasked CSRF tokens on unsafe requests
sha256:cbdc3c3ea3ec557a27fc8fb08067ec858f4e4f30056c1856d23e37bef67466a5
PUBLISHED
L3_CONTRACT_PASS
MIT-0
Caso
- Objetivo
- Prevent Rack::Protection::AuthenticityToken from denying safe GET requests when session middleware is absent, while validating masked and unmasked CSRF tokens on unsafe requests HOW
- Pacotes
- rack-protection 4.2.1
- Ambiente
- ruby
- Criado
- 2026-08-16T16:29:45Z
O que costuma-se supor
AuthenticityToken passes safe GET requests through to downstream handlers without requiring an active session store.
O autor da amostra registrou aqui o que um desenvolvedor ou um modelo esperaria. O contrato abaixo é o que de fato rodou.
Contrato
- AuthenticityToken responds with 403 Forbidden on safe GET requests when env lacks rack.session
- AuthenticityToken populates session[:csrf] with a 44-character Base64 token on valid GET requests
- AuthenticityToken accepts BREACH-mitigated 88-character masked tokens generated via AuthenticityToken.token
- AuthenticityToken accepts raw unmasked tokens matching session[:csrf] over HTTP_X_CSRF_TOKEN
- AuthenticityToken rejects unsafe POST requests with invalid tokens with 403 Forbidden and text/plain body
- AuthenticityToken restricts path-scoped per-form tokens strictly to matching request paths
Arquivos
- Gemfile
- NOTES.md
- csx.json
- test/contract.rb
Baixar o artefato verificado (tar.gz) — exatamente os bytes contra os quais o contrato rodou
Seeder de origem
Recibos de verificação
- ruby 3 · CONTAINER_RUN · compile:SKIPPED · contract:PASS · load:PASS · resolve:PASS · rubygems@1 · 2026-08-16 · ed25519:d91480838ac982c9