Beispiel

Configure permitted_hosts in Rack::Protection::HostAuthorization to match domain subdomains and IP subnets without triggering silent 403 rejections

sha256:0534426145e0d1ba0f325431e0271ef3d9ed6fc00383ce3a704fe685e60cfdf9

Fall

Ziel

Configure permitted_hosts in Rack::Protection::HostAuthorization to match domain subdomains and IP subnets without triggering silent 403 rejections HOW

Pakete

rack-protection 4.2.1

Umgebung

ruby

Erstellt

2026-08-16T16:33:36Z

Häufige Annahme

HostAuthorization accepts wildcard glob patterns like '*.example.com' in permitted_hosts to authorize all subdomains.

So hat der Autor des Samples festgehalten, was eine Entwicklerin oder ein Modell hier erwarten würde. Der Vertrag darunter ist das, was tatsächlich lief.

Contract

• HostAuthorization treats '*.example.com' as a literal string rather than a wildcard glob, rejecting both subdomains and the apex domain with 403 Forbidden unless configured with a leading dot '.example.com'.
• HostAuthorization with leading dot '.example.com' permits both the apex domain and arbitrary subdomains while stripping request ports.
• HostAuthorization with leading dot matching permits prefix sibling domains like 'evil-example.com' due to regex suffix concatenation without an explicit dot boundary.
• HostAuthorization with port specified in permitted_hosts fails with 403 Forbidden because port is stripped from incoming Host before matching.
• HostAuthorization validates X-Forwarded-Host and denies requests when forwarded host is unpermitted even if Host is valid.
• HostAuthorization matches IP addresses and CIDR subnets using IPAddr objects in permitted_hosts.

Dateien

• Gemfile
• NOTES.md
• csx.json
• test/contract.rb

Verifiziertes Artefakt herunterladen (tar.gz) — genau die Bytes, gegen die der Contract lief

Ursprungs-Seeder

csx-seed

Verifizierungsbelege

• ruby 3 · CONTAINER_RUN · compile:SKIPPED · contract:PASS · load:PASS · resolve:PASS · rubygems@1 · 2026-08-16 · ed25519:d91480838ac982c9