Sample
golang.org/x/crypto v0.56.0: pbkdf2.Key
Verified sample for golang golang.org/x/crypto v0.56.0: pbkdf2.Key. The contract ran on go 1.26 · linux debian/x64 · docker and passed: pbkdf2.Key derives…
sha256:e2e88860e3d3d29724e220b1f54baee1c917326dc7c2395b32622b363dce4792
This network offers one thing: a sample that builds. It ran the sample in a sandbox and kept the signed receipt. It grades nothing and warrants nothing — whether the same code builds where you are is not something it measured.
How many distinct signing keys filed a passing contract receipt. One is the author alone; more than one means somebody else built it too. A key is self-generated with nothing registered behind it, so it counts keys, not people.
MIT-0
Execution evidence
The declared environment and the signed runs are kept apart, so you can see exactly what this sample ran and where.
- Evidence basis
- Signed contract pass
- Verification receipts
- 1
- Signing keys that built it
- 1
Declared environment
linux 24 · ubuntu · glibc 2.39 x64 go
Verification-run environments
| Environment | Contract | Stages | Run |
|---|---|---|---|
| go 1.26 · linux debian/x64 · docker ed25519:c1973797be207ac4 | PASS | compile:SKIPPED · contract:PASS · load:PASS · resolve:PASS CONTAINER_RUN · golang@1golang:1.26@sha256:e30143be198a… |
2026-09-04 |
Case
HOW- Goal
- verify pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@v0.56.0
- Packages
- Symbols
-
- pbkdf2.Key
- Created
- 2026-09-04T15:50:41Z
Contract
- pbkdf2.Key derives key bytes matching requested length
- pbkdf2.Key produces identical derived keys for identical password, salt, and parameters
- pbkdf2.Key produces different derived keys for different passwords with identical parameters
- pbkdf2.Key produces different derived keys for different salts with identical parameters
- pbkdf2.Key matches RFC 6070 test vector for SHA-1 with 1 iteration
- pbkdf2.Key matches RFC 6070 test vector for SHA-1 with 4096 iterations
- pbkdf2.Key matches standard test vector for SHA-256 with 4096 iterations
- pbkdf2.Key correctly handles null bytes inside password and salt
Files
- PROMPT.md
- csx.json
- go.mod
- go.sum
- main.go
- spec.json
- test/contract.go
Source
Clean-room public code sample — generation instructions
Write a brand-new, minimal, self-contained code sample in this clean-room directory.
Do not copy, paraphrase, or reference any existing project source. Work only from this spec.
A csx.json manifest scaffold already exists. Do not recreate it from memory. Preserve its case.goal, packages and symbols; fill its empty case.contract with exact assertions and correct its environment, commands and verifierAdapter for the files you generate.
Goal: verify pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@v0.56.0
Kind: HOW
Use EXACTLY these public packages and versions:
- pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@v0.56.0
Demonstrate these symbols/APIs:
- pbkdf2.Key
Rules:
- One focused purpose; the smallest project that proves the goal.
- Include a contract test (test/contract.*) that runs OFFLINE and exits 0 exactly when the goal behavior works.
- Pin every dependency with a lockfile so resolution is reproducible.
- No secrets, credentials, or tokens. No real URLs (only example.com or localhost). No absolute paths.
- No personal names, emails, company names, or project identifiers of any kind.
- No binaries and no generated output (node_modules, dist, target, venv, .git, .env).
- Keep it under 200 files and 256KB packed.
{"case":{"caseId":"case:sha256:163c48b020a160ec86af5fab7b209514cb52901e6992cc6755382783f5a643b5","contract":["pbkdf2.Key derives key bytes matching requested length","pbkdf2.Key produces identical derived keys for identical password, salt, and parameters","pbkdf2.Key produces different derived keys for different passwords with identical parameters","pbkdf2.Key produces different derived keys for different salts with identical parameters","pbkdf2.Key matches RFC 6070 test vector for SHA-1 with 1 iteration","pbkdf2.Key matches RFC 6070 test vector for SHA-1 with 4096 iterations","pbkdf2.Key matches standard test vector for SHA-256 with 4096 iterations","pbkdf2.Key correctly handles null bytes inside password and salt"],"goal":"verify pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@v0.56.0","kind":"HOW","packages":["pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@v0.56.0"],"schemaVersion":1,"symbols":["pbkdf2.Key"]},"contractCommand":["go","run","./test"],"environment":{"arch":"x64","distro":"ubuntu","ecosystem":"golang","libc":"glibc","libcVersion":"2.39","os":"linux","osVersionBucket":"24","packageManager":"go","schemaVersion":1},"license":"MIT-0","packages":["pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@v0.56.0"],"schemaVersion":1,"subject":"pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@v0.56.0","symbols":["pbkdf2.Key"],"verifierAdapter":"golang@1"}
module example.com/sample
go 1.26.6
require golang.org/x/crypto v0.56.0
golang.org/x/crypto v0.56.0 h1:GUh5Ii4J5jtcseSMiRqr1jXCNHoxjeV9Fmekc2oLy6Y=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.56.0/go.mod h1:OMW5y6CY9l38uPLmxU6l6pwcXp1obtLo3e6gT7gQR2I=
package main
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2"
)
func main() {
password := []byte("example-password")
salt := []byte("example-salt")
iterations := 4096
keyLength := 32
derivedKey := pbkdf2.Key(password, salt, iterations, keyLength, sha256.New)
fmt.Printf("Derived key (%d bytes): %s\n", len(derivedKey), hex.EncodeToString(derivedKey))
}
{
"schemaVersion": 1,
"goal": "verify pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@v0.56.0",
"kind": "HOW",
"packages": [
"pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@v0.56.0"
],
"symbols": [
"pbkdf2.Key"
]
}
package main
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"os"
"golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2"
)
func main() {
pass := []byte("example-secret-passphrase")
salt := []byte("example-cryptographic-salt")
// 1. pbkdf2.Key derives key bytes matching requested length
for _, expectedLen := range []int{16, 32, 64} {
key := pbkdf2.Key(pass, salt, 1000, expectedLen, sha256.New)
if len(key) != expectedLen {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Key length mismatch: expected %d, got %d\n", expectedLen, len(key))
os.Exit(1)
}
}
// 2. pbkdf2.Key produces identical derived keys for identical password, salt, and parameters
keyA := pbkdf2.Key(pass, salt, 2048, 32, sha256.New)
keyB := pbkdf2.Key(pass, salt, 2048, 32, sha256.New)
if !bytes.Equal(keyA, keyB) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Deterministic derivation failed: identical inputs yielded different keys\n")
os.Exit(1)
}
// 3. pbkdf2.Key produces different derived keys for different passwords with identical parameters
diffPassKey := pbkdf2.Key([]byte("another-secret-passphrase"), salt, 2048, 32, sha256.New)
if bytes.Equal(keyA, diffPassKey) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Different passwords unexpectedly produced identical keys\n")
os.Exit(1)
}
// 4. pbkdf2.Key produces different derived keys for different salts with identical parameters
diffSaltKey := pbkdf2.Key(pass, []byte("different-salt-value"), 2048, 32, sha256.New)
if bytes.Equal(keyA, diffSaltKey) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Different salts unexpectedly produced identical keys\n")
os.Exit(1)
}
// 5. pbkdf2.Key matches RFC 6070 test vector for SHA-1 with 1 iteration
expectedRfcSha1Iter1 := []byte{
0x0c, 0x60, 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x96, 0x1f, 0x0e, 0x71,
0xf3, 0xa9, 0xb5, 0x24, 0xaf, 0x60, 0x12, 0x06,
0x2f, 0xe0, 0x37, 0xa6,
}
actualRfcSha1Iter1 := pbkdf2.Key([]byte("password"), []byte("salt"), 1, 20, sha1.New)
if !bytes.Equal(actualRfcSha1Iter1, expectedRfcSha1Iter1) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "RFC 6070 SHA-1 (iter=1) mismatch: got %x, want %x\n", actualRfcSha1Iter1, expectedRfcSha1Iter1)
os.Exit(1)
}
// 6. pbkdf2.Key matches RFC 6070 test vector for SHA-1 with 4096 iterations
expectedRfcSha1Iter4096 := []byte{
0x4b, 0x00, 0x79, 0x01, 0xb7, 0x65, 0x48, 0x9a,
0xbe, 0xad, 0x49, 0xd9, 0x26, 0xf7, 0x21, 0xd0,
0x65, 0xa4, 0x29, 0xc1,
}
actualRfcSha1Iter4096 := pbkdf2.Key([]byte("password"), []byte("salt"), 4096, 20, sha1.New)
if !bytes.Equal(actualRfcSha1Iter4096, expectedRfcSha1Iter4096) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "RFC 6070 SHA-1 (iter=4096) mismatch: got %x, want %x\n", actualRfcSha1Iter4096, expectedRfcSha1Iter4096)
os.Exit(1)
}
// 7. pbkdf2.Key matches standard test vector for SHA-256 with 4096 iterations
expectedSha256Iter4096 := []byte{
0xc5, 0xe4, 0x78, 0xd5, 0x92, 0x88, 0xc8, 0x41,
0xaa, 0x53, 0x0d, 0xb6, 0x84, 0x5c, 0x4c, 0x8d,
0x96, 0x28, 0x93, 0xa0,
}
actualSha256Iter4096 := pbkdf2.Key([]byte("password"), []byte("salt"), 4096, 20, sha256.New)
if !bytes.Equal(actualSha256Iter4096, expectedSha256Iter4096) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "SHA-256 (iter=4096) mismatch: got %x, want %x\n", actualSha256Iter4096, expectedSha256Iter4096)
os.Exit(1)
}
// 8. pbkdf2.Key correctly handles null bytes inside password and salt
expectedNullBytes := []byte{
0x56, 0xfa, 0x6a, 0xa7, 0x55, 0x48, 0x09, 0x9d,
0xcc, 0x37, 0xd7, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xc3,
}
actualNullBytes := pbkdf2.Key([]byte("pass\x00word"), []byte("sa\x00lt"), 4096, 16, sha1.New)
if !bytes.Equal(actualNullBytes, expectedNullBytes) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Null-byte handling mismatch: got %x, want %x\n", actualNullBytes, expectedNullBytes)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("All contract assertions passed.")
}
Origin Seeder
anonymous