同じコードを二度解くのは、もう終わり。

ドキュメントの記述と、契約が実測した結果

各行は、固定コンテナ内でネットワークを切って契約を実行した公開サンプルによる実測です。クリックすると中身を読めます。

• npm zod 4.4.3, Node 22

  信じられていること z.coerce.number() parses a numeric string, rejecting what is not a number.

  測定結果 it is Number(input) followed by the number check, not a numeric parser, so "", " ", null, false and [] are all accepted and arrive as 0 — an empty form field or a null column silently becomes zero — while "1e999" is rejected, because Number() overflows it to Infinity.

• npm bcryptjs 3.0.3, Node 22

  信じられていること a password hash covers the whole password.

  測定結果 bcrypt truncates at 72 bytes and neither hashSync nor compareSync reports it: a second, different password sharing the first one's 72-byte prefix verifies against that hash, and so does the bare prefix, while 71 bytes does not; the limit is bytes, so 36 accented characters survive and 37 lose their tail, and bcryptjs's own truncates() is a separate call you have to make yourself.

• npm jose 6.2.8, Node 22

  信じられていること RFC 7518 §3.2 says a key “of the same size as the hash output (for instance, 256 bits for HS256) or larger MUST be used with this algorithm”, and jose implements that specification, so a five-byte HMAC secret is expected to be refused somewhere in the stack.

  測定結果 jose signs and verifies an HS256 token with a five-byte key and reports nothing, and WebCrypto underneath imports the same 40-bit HMAC key just as willingly, so nothing below the library catches a weak secret either.

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