示例
rack-protection 4.2.1: Rack::Protection::CookieTossing persists detected duplicate cookie names in @bad_cookies across requests, causing subsequent valid requests on the shared middleware instance to fail with 403 Forbidden
已验证示例 — gem rack-protection 4.2.1: Rack::Protection::CookieTossing persists detected duplicate cookie names in @bad_cookies across requests, causing…
sha256:de525c5063edd41b2129d8989415035efd382bbaa6dd7d0fd59f815fd6c16e71
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MIT-0
执行证据
声明的环境与签名的运行分开呈现,你可以看到这个样本究竟运行了什么、在哪里运行。
- 证据依据
- 签名契约通过
- 验证回执
- 2
- 构建过它的签名密钥
- 1
声明的环境
ruby linux x64 ruby ruby gem
验证运行环境
| 环境 | 契约 | 阶段 | 运行日期 |
|---|---|---|---|
| ruby 3 · linux debian/x64 · docker ed25519:d91480838ac982c9 | PASS | compile:SKIPPED · contract:PASS · load:PASS · resolve:PASS CONTAINER_RUN · rubygems@1 |
2026-08-16 |
| ruby 3 · linux debian/x64 · docker ed25519:2175b912ea1c23b1 | SKIPPED | compile:SKIPPED · contract:SKIPPED · load:SKIPPED · resolve:FAIL CONTAINER_RUN · rubygems@1 |
2026-08-18 |
案例
HOW- 目标
- Rack::Protection::CookieTossing persists detected duplicate cookie names in @bad_cookies across requests, causing subsequent valid requests on the shared middleware instance to fail with 403 Forbidden
- 符号
-
- Rack::Protection::CookieTossing
- 环境
- ruby
- 创建时间
- 2026-08-16T17:43:17Z
契约
- Calling Rack::Protection::CookieTossing with a subsequent valid request returns HTTP status 403 Forbidden rather than 200 OK because detected malicious cookie names are retained on the middleware instance in @bad_cookies across requests.
- Initial valid request on a clean Rack::Protection::CookieTossing instance returns status 200 OK and leaves bad_cookies empty.
- Request with duplicate session cookies returns status 403 Forbidden and populates bad_cookies with the session cookie key.
- The middleware instance retains detected bad cookie names in its instance variable bad_cookies indefinitely after a rejected request.
- Concurrent threads sharing the same Rack::Protection::CookieTossing instance all receive 403 Forbidden on valid requests once an attack request is handled.
文件
- Gemfile
- NOTES.md
- csx.json
- test/contract.rb
源代码
source "https://rubygems.org"
gem "rack-protection", "4.2.1"
# Rack::Protection::CookieTossing State Pollution Across Requests
## Search Result
`search_known_solution` returned `NO_SAFE_MATCH` (only low-confidence cross-ecosystem alternatives for Tower and Axum, with no existing sample covering `rack-protection` cookie tossing or instance-level state leakage).
## Failure Mode
Code assuming `Rack::Protection::CookieTossing` evaluates requests independently fails loudly with an unexpected HTTP 403 Forbidden status on valid subsequent requests handled by the same middleware instance.
{"case":{"believed":"Rack::Protection::CookieTossing evaluates each request independently so that a subsequent valid request with no duplicate cookies succeeds after an earlier attack request was rejected.","caseId":"case:sha256:b4fd96990170a5c0184eafdffe4713d598aeed35607ac2e109dd78d9dc7c99f6","contract":["Calling Rack::Protection::CookieTossing with a subsequent valid request returns HTTP status 403 Forbidden rather than 200 OK because detected malicious cookie names are retained on the middleware instance in @bad_cookies across requests.","Initial valid request on a clean Rack::Protection::CookieTossing instance returns status 200 OK and leaves bad_cookies empty.","Request with duplicate session cookies returns status 403 Forbidden and populates bad_cookies with the session cookie key.","The middleware instance retains detected bad cookie names in its instance variable bad_cookies indefinitely after a rejected request.","Concurrent threads sharing the same Rack::Protection::CookieTossing instance all receive 403 Forbidden on valid requests once an attack request is handled."],"goal":"Rack::Protection::CookieTossing persists detected duplicate cookie names in @bad_cookies across requests, causing subsequent valid requests on the shared middleware instance to fail with 403 Forbidden","kind":"HOW","packages":["pkg:gem/rack-protection@4.2.1"],"schemaVersion":1,"symbols":["Rack::Protection::CookieTossing"]},"contractCommand":["ruby","test/contract.rb"],"environment":{"arch":"x64","ecosystem":"gem","executionContext":"ruby","language":"ruby","os":"linux","packageManager":"gem","runtime":"ruby","schemaVersion":1},"license":"MIT-0","packages":["pkg:gem/rack-protection@4.2.1"],"schemaVersion":1,"symbols":["Rack::Protection::CookieTossing"],"verifierAdapter":"rubygems@1"}
# frozen_string_literal: true
require 'rack/protection'
def assert_equal(expected, actual, message = nil)
return if expected == actual
msg = message ? "#{message} - " : ''
raise "#{msg}Expected #{expected.inspect}, got #{actual.inspect}"
end
def assert(condition, message = 'Assertion failed')
raise message unless condition
end
# Inner Rack application returning 200 OK
inner_app = ->(_env) { [200, { 'content-type' => 'text/plain' }, ['OK']] }
# Middleware is instantiated once at server startup and shared across requests
middleware = Rack::Protection::CookieTossing.new(inner_app)
# 1. Initial valid request on a clean middleware instance succeeds with 200 OK
clean_env_1 = {
'REQUEST_METHOD' => 'GET',
'PATH_INFO' => '/',
'HTTP_HOST' => 'example.com',
'HTTP_COOKIE' => 'rack.session=valid_session_token'
}
status1, _, _ = middleware.call(clean_env_1)
assert_equal 200, status1, 'Fresh middleware instance accepts valid request'
assert_equal [], middleware.bad_cookies, 'bad_cookies array is initially empty'
# 2. Attack request with tossed duplicate session cookie is rejected with 403 Forbidden
attack_env = {
'REQUEST_METHOD' => 'GET',
'PATH_INFO' => '/',
'HTTP_HOST' => 'example.com',
'HTTP_COOKIE' => 'rack.session=forged_token; rack.session=valid_session_token'
}
status2, _, _ = middleware.call(attack_env)
assert_equal 403, status2, 'Cookie tossing attack request is rejected with 403'
# 3. CONTRADICTION / THE TRAP:
# A naive developer/model expects subsequent valid requests on the middleware instance to return 200 OK.
# However, CookieTossing mutates @bad_cookies on the middleware instance and never clears it,
# so the subsequent valid request is rejected with 403 Forbidden.
clean_env_2 = {
'REQUEST_METHOD' => 'GET',
'PATH_INFO' => '/',
'HTTP_HOST' => 'example.com',
'HTTP_COOKIE' => 'rack.session=valid_session_token'
}
status3, _, _ = middleware.call(clean_env_2)
assert_equal 403, status3,
'Subsequent valid request returns 403 Forbidden because @bad_cookies persists on the middleware instance'
# 4. Inspect instance state: @bad_cookies retains the detected cookie name indefinitely
assert_equal ['rack.session'], middleware.bad_cookies,
'Instance variable @bad_cookies retains polluted state across requests'
# 5. Concurrent / multi-threaded requests sharing the same middleware instance also fail with 403
threads = 4.times.map do
Thread.new do
clean_env = {
'REQUEST_METHOD' => 'GET',
'PATH_INFO' => '/',
'HTTP_HOST' => 'example.com'
}
status, _, _ = middleware.call(clean_env)
status
end
end
thread_statuses = threads.map(&:value)
assert_equal [403, 403, 403, 403], thread_statuses,
'All concurrent threads sharing the middleware instance receive 403 Forbidden'
puts 'All Rack::Protection::CookieTossing contract assertions passed.'