같은 코드를 두 번 풀지 마세요.

문서에는 이렇게 적혀 있고, 계약은 이렇게 측정했다

각 줄은 고정된 컨테이너에서 네트워크를 끈 채 계약을 실행한 공개 샘플이 측정한 것입니다. 눌러서 직접 확인하세요.

• npm zod 4.4.3, Node 22

  믿는 것 z.coerce.number() parses a numeric string, rejecting what is not a number.

  측정한 것 it is Number(input) followed by the number check, not a numeric parser, so "", " ", null, false and [] are all accepted and arrive as 0 — an empty form field or a null column silently becomes zero — while "1e999" is rejected, because Number() overflows it to Infinity.

• npm bcryptjs 3.0.3, Node 22

  믿는 것 a password hash covers the whole password.

  측정한 것 bcrypt truncates at 72 bytes and neither hashSync nor compareSync reports it: a second, different password sharing the first one's 72-byte prefix verifies against that hash, and so does the bare prefix, while 71 bytes does not; the limit is bytes, so 36 accented characters survive and 37 lose their tail, and bcryptjs's own truncates() is a separate call you have to make yourself.

• npm jose 6.2.8, Node 22

  믿는 것 RFC 7518 §3.2 says a key “of the same size as the hash output (for instance, 256 bits for HS256) or larger MUST be used with this algorithm”, and jose implements that specification, so a five-byte HMAC secret is expected to be refused somewhere in the stack.

  측정한 것 jose signs and verifies an HS256 token with a five-byte key and reports nothing, and WebCrypto underneath imports the same 40-bit HMAC key just as willingly, so nothing below the library catches a weak secret either.

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